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a  b  s  t  r a  c t
Questions  abound about the  appropriate governance systems  to  manage  the  risks of unconventional  oil
and  gas development,  and the  ability for  citizens to engage  and participate  in those systems. In this paper,
we map the  development of shale  gas governance  in the  US  and  UK; we  highlight the contrasting  sys-
tems of land ownership and  mineral  rights, compare the  opportunities  that  these systems of governance
present  the  general  public to  participate  and  become  involved in shale gas decisions  and  consider the
implications  on issues  of social  justice.
We conclude  that  in both  countries,  that  despite  government  and industry engagement  rhetoric  and
associated  processes, the  publics’  influence  on shale gas  decisions  is perceived to  be  minimal  or  not  at all.
We argue  that  the  implications of  the  observed  institutional  governance systems,  with  few  opportunities
for  citizen  influence, are  developments  which  inherently  lack social  justice,  procedural  fairness,  and
ultimately,  a social  license  to  operate.
© 2017 The  Author(s).  Published by  Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an  open  access article  under  the  CC  BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Shale gas energy policy and exploration in the UK is  an area
of emerging interest, for both academic researchers and policy
makers. Scholars have asserted that despite the significance of tech-
nological considerations and challenges, the process of extraction
and utilising unconventional oil and gas is not simply a  technolog-
ical issue [1].  Questions abound, however, about the appropriate
governance systems to manage the risks of unconventional oil
and gas development and the ability for citizens to engage and
participate in those systems [2].  In the context of shale gas devel-
opment and its  associated, multidisciplinary risks, governance has
been posited as “the most critical domain” to facilitate changes
and improve the management of these risks [3]. Governance is
a complex, multifarious notion. Sovacool and Cooper [4] refer to
three interrelated meanings of governance, in the context of energy
megaprojects:
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1.  Governance can refer to the internal operation and management
of the megaproject itself, e.g. how well it is built and maintained.
2.  Governance can refer to  the economics and politics of the system,
e.g. the coalitions of interest involved in  supporting or opposing
a megaproject.
3. Governance can refer to  the interaction between the technology
of a  megaproject and the types of social organisation it creates,
e.g. whether it is  controlling or democratic.
We focus on the third of these and consider governance in  the
context of public participation and social justice, contributing to the
evolving research on energy justice [4–7].  Evaluating where injus-
tices occur within this context and what processes exist to remedy
these [8] would seem a  sensible definition of our approach to under-
standing energy justice. We consider how energy systems can or
should be  governed in  a  way  that contributes towards a  fair and just
society through a US/UK comparison of shale gas developments.
The US shale energy industry is  well-established, and has largely
followed the existing procedures in relation to governance and
public engagement practices set by the conventional oil  and gas
industry, with some additional regulatory actions. Fundamentally,
the choice to explore and extract in the US setting is based on a
private transaction between a  landowner and an energy company.
Despite some differences in property rights from state to state, the
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.01.015
2214-6296/© 2017 The  Author(s). Published by  Elsevier Ltd. This  is  an  open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
12 J.  Whitton et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 26 (2017) 11–22
contract between the company and the owner of the sub-surface
rights governs that transaction (as set out by state law). The rules
by which that extraction (and production, transmission, and con-
sumption of the energy source) take place is then governed by a
series of federal, regional, state, and local regulations. This com-
plex web makes public participation challenging, as there is  no
clear pathway for participation nor surety of influence giving rise
to grassroots opposition from multiple organizations. The impor-
tance of governance systems on project success can be seen in  other
resource-based industries. Foster and Gardun˜o  [9] observe that in
groundwater management, it is  often not a  “lack of knowledge
about sustainable yield or  pollution vulnerability of aquifers” (p.
317) that are responsible for failures, but inadequate arrangements
surrounding governance.
The UK is only now beginning to explore the possibilities of how
extensive shale gas reserves, if exploited, could impact on energy
prices, job creation and communities. The infancy of the shale gas
exploration process in the UK provides a  contrast, described as
‘puzzling’ by Cairney et al. [10],  to the ‘all out for shale’ position
of the 2010–2015 Coalition government [11].  Underground min-
eral resources are owned by  the Crown Estate in the UK, and the
process of exploring and extracting these resources is  governed by
a  system of national laws. The UK government has established the
Office for Unconventional Gas and Oil (OUGO), and are proposing to
simplify the planning process for deep drilling of shale gas, oil  and
geothermal energy sources with the 2014–2015 Infrastructure Bill.
This appears to reflect the “significant development support” from
the UK government as discussed by Hammond and O’Grady [12].
The authors suggest that this interest in-part is  due to  the potential
‘game changer’ benefits for the UK from extracting large quanti-
ties of shale gas, which the IEA have suggested could contribute
towards a ‘Golden Age of Gas’ [13].
At the local level, engagement and participation are important
to generate what is referred to  in the extractive industries as “social
license to operate” (SLO) – a  social psychological phenomenon of
implicit trust relationships to  establish legitimate extraction activi-
ties with mutual industry and community backing [14]. Demuijnck
and Fasterling [15] observe that SLO is a  critical element of per-
ceived legitimacy, stating that “business enterprises invoke the
“social license to operate” (SLO) to indicate that their activities are
considered as legitimate in the eyes of society” (p. 675). It  is  also
important for reasons of demonstrating societal support in indus-
trial activities, or in  mitigating obstructive opposition; Moffat and
Zhang [16] note that SLO  relates to “the ongoing acceptance and
approval” (p. 61) of extractive developments by local and other
stakeholders, and organisations such as the International Energy
Agency [13] suggest that a  SLO is required by shale gas operators
(in [17]). We  argue that sustainable and legitimate governance sys-
tems require long-term support, approval and acceptance from a
variety of stakeholders, and that their meaningful participation in
decision-making processes is an important part of achieving this.
In this paper, we examine the experiences of shale gas devel-
opment in the US (broadly, and specifically in Pennsylvania) and
the UK (broadly, and specifically in  Lancashire). The comparison of
these two settings provides insights into the differing governance
systems and their potential for public participation. Following a
review of the opportunities for participation in  each county, we
discuss the implications for social and energy justice with refer-
ence to our own  community-led approach to participation [18].
We  argue that this approach can achieve a  form of legitimacy
that allows communities to derive social priorities by a  process of
‘community visioning’, thereby promoting an active role for mem-
bers of the public in energy decisions; specifically in  the dialogue
between government, industry and local communities. We also dis-
cuss to what degree we can evidence procedural justice in shale
gas decisions that advances a concept of fairness. This comprises
two elements; is  the process fair, and is  the outcome equitable. As
Walker [19] notes, justice theory has moved beyond the distribu-
tional to emphasise the role of process and procedure. Justice claims
often extend beyond the distribution of benefits and cite procedu-
ral and regulatory fairness, including the role of stakeholders in
decision-making. In recent literature, Cotton [20] asserts that the
achievement of fair outcomes, and therefore justice, is  dependent
on establishing process-based fairness, honesty, accountability and
transparency.
2. Development of the shale gas industry in the US and UK
Geologists have known about the reserves contained within
“unconventional” sources (low permeability shale and sandstone
or coal seams) of natural gas for decades but did not have the tech-
nology to  extract it economically. In the 1970s, a  combination of
factors – including industry concerns about declining natural gas
production, and federal government concerns about the produc-
tivity of domestic energy sources in  the wake of the energy crisis –
led to a  loose coalition of private and public entities that invested
in  developing the geological knowledge and technological capac-
ity to extract natural gas from unconventional sources [21–23].
Three critical technologies emerged from these investments, and
have been crucial to the recent growth in  shale gas extraction:
three-dimensional micro seismic imaging to map  the underground
formations; hydraulic fracturing to effectively release the natural
gas from the pores in the rock; and horizontal drilling techniques to
interface with a  larger section of the shale layers. These technolo-
gies were proven successful in  the Barnett shale in Texas, which
was the first formation to move into commercial production in the
early 2000s when Mitchell Energy developed an effective “slickwa-
ter” that maximized the output of natural gas for the investment in
materials in  the hydraulic fracturing process.
2.1. Development of shale gas industry in US
In  the US, the technique of hydraulic fracturing has been widely
employed to  extract shale gas from areas such as the Barnett and
Marcellus shale basins for over a  decade, significantly changing the
energy portfolio of the country and natural gas prices. The natural
gas industry has grown over 20%  in  the past 5 years, with 146,000
new producing wells being established during the past 10 years,
aided significantly by the expansion of the shale gas industry and
the increased use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing
techniques [24].  This has resulted in one of the largest surges in
energy production in the country’s history [25].
Since the early 2000s, the techniques discussed above were
adopted by other production companies, and led, in  combination
with a  rapid rise in  the price of natural gas, to the exploration
of a  series of shale plays across the US between 2003 and 2011
(i.e. Fayetteville, Woodford, Haynesville, Marcellus, and Eagle Ford)
and concomitant growth in production. The US Energy Information
Administration (EIA) projects that shale-based natural gas produc-
tion will grow from 0.75 trillion cubic feet per year as recorded in
2005 (4.1% of all gas produced in  the US) to 19.8 trillion cubic feet
per year in  2040 (53% of all gas produced) [26].
Of the US plays, the Marcellus Shale is  the largest in  terms of
acreage, wells, and production [22].  The first Marcellus well was
initially developed in 2003 by Range Resources in  Washington
County, Pennsylvania [21]. Between 2004 and the end of 2015,
14,022 unconventional wells had been drilled in the Appalachian
Basin, including Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia [27].  The
majority of these (9590) had been drilled in Pennsylvania alone
[28].
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Fig. 1. Permits Issued and Wells Drilled in  the US between 2007 and 2014.
In  this time, the Appalachian Basin would grow to  become the
most productive shale gas reserve in the US (accounting for nearly
40%  of US shale production) [29], and contributing substantially to
recent increases in estimates of natural gas proved reserves (from
186.5 tcf in 2000–388.8 tcf in 2014) [30].  Pennsylvania in  particular
has seen rapid growth over the past decade (Fig. 1).
This rapid development of unconventional natural gas resources
in the Appalachian region has led to many concerns about the
potential community, economic, health, and environmental conse-
quences. The academic literature documenting these impacts has,
however, been very mixed (see [31] for a  summary).
Studies conducted in the US on public perceptions of hydraulic
fracturing (e.g. [32])  are valuable in informing similar social
research in the UK, and in  enabling comparative research between
the US and the UK. Despite the establishment of the shale gas indus-
try in the US for many years now, Boudet et al. [32] found public
familiarity with hydraulic fracturing to be low, with significant lev-
els of uncertainty in regards to  the public’s support of shale gas
extraction. Stedman et al. [33] concur with Boudet et al. [32] in
regards to levels of knowledge of the shale gas industry being found
to be relatively low. Public support for shale gas extraction in the US,
is higher in states such as Pennsylvania where the industry is  estab-
lished and has been actively extracting shale gas from the Marcellus
basin for over a  decade [34],  and far lower in  New York State where
until recently there have been extensive environmental and regu-
latory reviews. Drilling of the Marcellus shale in  the state was on
hold for a period of time [35], before being rejected and banned by
the  State Governor in December of 2014 [36].
2.2. Development of shale gas in the UK
The UK Government supports shale gas exploration and extrac-
tion, for reasons of energy security, job  creation and economic
growth [37]. Concurrent to a strong public reaction in the UK to the
potential growth of this industry and the utilisation of hydraulic
fracturing techniques, there is an emerging body of social science
research regarding the UK experience [38].
The situation is the U.K. is different to  the US, with a popula-
tion density of 256 per km2 [37]. There are also cultural differences
between the US and the UK, with lifestyles in the UK being differing
in both an international and intranational context. With population
density, culture and lifestyle being identified as key factors in the
impact of unconventional gas developments [37], the unique soci-
etal characteristics of the UK, and indeed the localities in which
shale gas developments are sited must be understood in  order to
manage the impacts of any future UK shale gas developments.
The UK shale gas industry is  at an early stage in  its develop-
ment; a number of wells have been drilled but as yet there has
been no commercial drilling. As a result, UK-based research has
had a  geological, geo-engineering and environmental focus, with
social science based research only emerging in  recent years. Hays
et al. [37] state that, whilst remaining aware of the distinct dif-
ferences between international case studies, countries looking to
develop shale gas resources would benefit from reflecting on the
experiences of the US. The author highlights the persistent impacts
of shale gas developments and short-comings in  regulation and
research in the US as an important lesson to others:
“U.S. experiences do not necessarily make safe shale gas  develop-
ment in the UK or any other part of the world untenable, but the
real world impacts that have been observed and the data gaps that
persist to date should not be ignored. In  particular, declarations
of best practices and strong regulation do not guarantee safety,
nor apparently do they reassure a significant proportion of public
opinion” (p. 37).
Despite the early stage of shale gas exploration in the UK, events
such as the well-publicised seismic tremors early in 2011 [39] –
when tremors of magnitudes 2.3 and 1.5 were generated at the
same time as drilling company Cuadrilla were operating wells in
Weeton, Lancashire – have already brought drilling techniques
and the industry in general under intense scrutiny. As a  result
of these seismic events, the UK Government imposed a morato-
rium in May  2011 and suspended shale-related drilling activities
across the country while an investigation was conducted into the
incidents. In  December 2012, as a  result of the findings of the inves-
tigation, these suspensions were removed and exploration drilling
was permitted to continue across the UK. During the UK Govern-
ment Spending Round 2013, the government announced a  series
of significant proposals to  bring about “economic incentivisation at
different scales of governance (for onshore oil and gas exploration
companies, councils and affected site communities)” ([40]: 1946);
these included industry tax breaks, the introduction of a  new reg-
ulatory framework, reduced business rates for local councils and
proposed community benefits packages [41]. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, one of the main outcomes from this Spending Round was  an
increase in applications from exploration companies for Petroleum
Exploration and Development Licenses (PEDLs) [40].
Since 2011, public opposition and resistance to the technique,
the local implications of exploration, and the motivations of the
industry have coalesced into a  vocal opposition of the development
of this energy industry in  the UK, with numerous activist groups
forming and protesting against exploratory activities. Uncertainty
lies at the heart of this, or as Cairney et al. ([10]: 2) specify, “a
dual sense of uncertainty”. On this duality, Cotton [40] notes that
scientific uncertainty around fracking safety, based on technical
information, is  one of the key areas which competing framings
of shale gas by stakeholder groups aim to manage, with the
other identified as decision-making uncertainty, based on politi-
cal information, surrounding licensing, taxation, mineral rights and
planning and regulatory frameworks [10].  As  Cairney et al. [10]
highlight, uncertainty may  be encountered among those attempt-
ing to influence the process, due to the following scalar division of
responsibility for different aspects of shale gas development:
• European Union – water quality.
• UK Government – mineral rights, licensing, taxation.
• Devolved Governments – planning.
• Local Authorities – permission to pursue drilling at specific sites.
Differences between the regulation and operational governance
of shale gas extraction in the US and UK are apparent. Shale gas com-
panies in  the UK are obliged, under the Water Resources Act 1991, to
disclose the composition of ‘fracking fluid’, which is  pumped down
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drilled well bores under pressure to fracture dense shale rock. This
is not the case in North America, where companies are permitted
to retain the composition of this fluid undisclosed, for reasons of
commercial confidentiality [12]. Other differences between the US
and the UK cases include the processes for leasing mineral rights
and the level of political discourse [42].  Stedman et al. [33] found
that despite the greater length of time that shale gas production
has been established in the US, knowledge of the shale gas indus-
try is greater in the UK, whilst support is  found to be greater in
the US. The authors found that knowledge and support are posi-
tively correlated in the UK, whilst no such correlation exists in the
US. Governance is  argued to  play a significant role in generating
such international distinctions. Stedman et al. [33] demonstrate the
validity of the information deficit model of science, with the authors
expressing that “concentrated media and governance in  the UK”
(p. 1) have impacted upon the generation of observed differences.
Concurrently, Cotton [40] notes that governance issues have been
found to influence stakeholder perceptions of risks and benefits and
contribute to observed heterogeneity, including negative leasing
and development experiences [43], the insufficiency of consulta-
tion measures locally [38,39] and the influence of compensation or
funding schemes [44].
Hays et al. [37], examine US shale gas development and discuss
the implications and key considerations for the UK. The authors
propose that development in the UK should be informed by and
built upon experience in the form of ‘tried and tested’ harm reduc-
tion strategies including ‘social risk’, and not on technically-derived
scenarios and theorised ‘best practice’ that are not empirically
supported. The authors stress the importance of utilising the expe-
rience of the US in UK decision-making, suggesting numerous
critical considerations based upon this experience. Regarding such
decision making processes, as we have previously proposed, they
argue greater transparency and public participation is needed
in the UK. Incorporating local stakeholder views into national
decision-making and the transparency of the decision-making pro-
cess continues to be a  persistent issue in the UK, a  tension we
identified previously for other energy scenarios such as the devel-
opment of new nuclear power stations in the UK [45]. Hays et al.
[37] also challenge the UK Government to  seriously consider the
probable longevity of the shale or unconventional gas develop-
ments (UGD) before long-term plans are established, particularly if
renewable forms of energy generation demonstrate growing eco-
nomic viability:
“In the end, policymakers and politicians must ask themselves and
their constituents whether the more immediate, recognizable gains
of UGD are worth the long-term, and in some cases permanent,
adverse environmental, climatic, and population health impacts.
They should consider how long shale gas development is likely
to persist as many other alternative, renewable energy sources
become economically viable, and whether as climate change effects
become more overt, it will be wise or acceptable to  the public to pro-
duce shale gas. Ideally, as the U.S. experience has demonstrated,
these considerations should come before broad scale extraction.”
([37]: 40)
3.  Shale gas regulation and ownership in  the US and UK
In this section, we compare and contrast the US and UK sys-
tems of shale gas governance and identify two critical issues that
influence the extent to  which the public can become involved in
decision making. These are the fragmented nature of unconven-
tional oil and gas regulation in  the US compared to the UK, and the
private ownership of subsurface rights in the US, when compared
to  the Government (Crown Estates) owned rights in  the UK.
3.1. Unconventional oil and gas  regulation and ownership in the
US
Unconventional oil  and gas development in  the US has been
governed largely as an extension of the existing framework for con-
ventional oil and gas [22], although with some important updates
and additions to that framework. As a result, the opportunities
for public engagement with new regulations have been limited to
the formal procedures allowed in  rulemaking procedures (hear-
ings, comment periods) for new regulations and programs, not the
overarching framework. In addition, the sheer complexity and frag-
mented nature of unconventional oil and gas regulation in the US
makes it difficult for a citizen to know how and where to  direct their
efforts. A  number of publications note this complexity, describ-
ing a regulatory framework that includes federal, state, local, and
regional (e.g., river basin) levels as well as multiple agencies and
relevant statutes [22,46] that govern specific components of  oil
and gas development. Federal authority pertains largely to  air and
water quality, endangered species, worker safety, hazardous mate-
rial management, and oversight for specific elements of the process
(such as permitting of underground injection wells where states do
not  have primacy). Federal jurisdiction also applies when the activ-
ity is  proposed to occur on federally-owned land (such as owned
by the Bureau of Land Management or  the US Forest Service). River
Basin Commissions, which are multi-state bodies created through
compacts ratified at the federal and state levels that manage the
water resources in  their respective watersheds, have regulatory
authority over specific activities related to watershed protection
(such as water withdrawals in relation to  natural gas development).
Most activities, however, are governed by the states, with primary
responsibility for all components of on-site activities, permitting
drilling, hydraulic fracturing, wastewater management, well plug-
ging, and site remediation. The roles of municipal governments vary
by state.
Richardson et al. [46] note that in addition to fragmentation
across jurisdictions, there is significant heterogeneity between
states in  their regulatory approaches. They find that  this hetero-
geneity partially reflects differences in degree of development,
geology, history, demographics, and economics of the states stud-
ied. This heterogeneity further decreases the ability of the public to
engage as the regulatory systems and space for public engagement
vary between states, as well as between the state level and federal
government.
Transparency of regulations and public access to information
has been a  consistent concern among those critical of unconven-
tional energy development in the US. These concerns have been
raised in relation to the contents of hydraulic fracturing fluids;
exposure of workers and nearby residents to pollutants, fracturing
fluid chemicals, and other materials; and settlements (often related
to contamination events) that  include nondisclosure agreements.
In some states, the regulations themselves are  can be difficult to
find (and may  even be contradictory) within the state’s statutes
and regulatory codes. The report by NETL [22] also notes that  the
predominance of case-by-case permitting in  many states makes it
very difficult to evaluate regulatory effectiveness without gather-
ing and reviewing all permits, stating that “this lack of transparency
is  identified as a significant barrier for stakeholders, whether they
are  firms seeking to comply with the law or interested members of
the public trying to understand it in light of environmental risks”
(p. 55). Some states have sought systems to  improve availability of
information to the public, such as websites with well information
and the encouraged or mandated use of sites like FracFocus (https://
fracfocus.org/);  the usability of state sites varies significantly across
states, with seemingly simple data requests such as well counts dif-
ficult to access in  some states (e.g. Texas) while others have  online
GIS and database tools (e.g. West Virginia, Pennsylvania).
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Some summaries of regulations of unconventional oil and gas
development note that several states have had to update their reg-
ulations in response to the rapid development of the industry, often
in places with relatively little oil  and gas activity historically or with
regulations that did not fit the new activity [46]. Some states have
experienced complete updating of all their regulatory structures,
with others seeking more targeted updates. The impact of the reces-
sion on regulatory capacity in  each state is not well understood.
In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that regulatory capacity,
particularly in some states, was limited because of the loss of expe-
rienced regulatory personnel to more lucrative positions in the
private oil and gas sector [47,22].
The  largely private ownership of subsurface rights means the
leasing process is a  private transaction between the owners of those
subsurface rights and the energy production company. This private
transaction (although governed by state law) is a contractual agree-
ment between two parties that does not provide an entry point
for public consideration of the proposed activity. Formal public
engagement is  then limited to  their participation in  the develop-
ment and implementation of the regulatory process that governs
the subsequent activity. The US shale energy industry is  well-
established, and has largely followed the existing procedures in
relation to governance and public engagement practices set by the
conventional oil and gas industry, with some additional regulatory
actions. Fundamentally the choice to explore and extract in the US
setting is based on a private transaction between a  landowner and
an energy company. Although there are some differences in  prop-
erty rights from state to  state, the contract between the company
and the owner of the subsurface rights governs that  transaction (as
set out by state law). The rules by  which that extraction (and pro-
duction, transmission, and consumption of the energy source) take
place is governed by  a series of federal, regional, state, and local reg-
ulations. This complex web makes public participation challenging,
as there is no clear pathway for participation nor surety of influence.
However, it has given rise to  grassroots opposition from multiple
organizations, and the possibility for civil society expansion into
areas in which citizens view regulatory systems to be lacking (e.g.
monitoring).
3.2. Unconventional oil and gas regulation and ownership in the
UK
In contrast to the US, the UK is only now beginning to explore
the possibilities of how extensive shale gas reserves, if exploited,
could impact on energy prices, job creation and communities. There
are currently two main regions of shale gas exploration interest.
The first is the Bowland-Hodder gas play running across central
England from Cheshire to  Yorkshire and the second are the Lias-
sic shales in the Weald Basin. Given the relative immaturity of the
shale gas exploration industry resource estimates in both regions
vary considerably. Current British Geological Survey estimates of
recoverable resources are 2.7 tcm  in the Bowland shale (the largest
resource) and less than 1 tcm in the Weald basin (see [48]). Industry
estimates are more optimistic. Two drilling tests conducted by oil
and gas company Cuadrilla in the Bowland area suggest the gas in
place in that area could be  around 5.7 tcm, with 15–20% of resources
in the Bowland shale deemed technically recoverable.
Of  critical importance are  the mineral rights regimes in  place:
the process of extraction licensing and its relationship to (surface)
land ownership. In the US (under most circumstances) split estate
laws separate the mineral estate from surface land owning rights,
and the mineral estate represents the dominate tenant (in most
states). The owner of the mineral estate has the right to  occupy the
amount of surface area necessary to extract the minerals, however,
the mineral rights holder must pay the surface owner any damages.
In the UK the mineral rights regime for oil and gas differs, in  that
extraction rights are  principally held by the Crown Estate in  the UK,
representing the interests of the reigning monarch – an archaic rule
that presumes that land is owned by the Crown unless there is evi-
dence to  prove otherwise. The process of exploring and extracting
these resources is governed by a  system of national laws. Crown
Estate is governed by a  board of trustees charged with maintain-
ing and improving the management and profitability of mineral
resources. In the UK overall, governance of mineral rights extends
out to  the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS): an area comprising of  those
areas of the seabed and beneath the seabed, beyond territorial
waters (up to a  12 mile limit), over which the UK exercises sovereign
rights of exploration and exploitation of mineral resources [49].  Oil
and gas rights have a slightly different governance regime to that
of other mineral resources (including coal). Ownership of oil and
gas within Great Britain was  vested in  the Crown by the Petroleum
(Production) Act 1934, followed by The Continental Shelf Act 1964
applying the provisions of the 1934 Act to the UKCS outside ter-
ritorial waters [49].  For onshore exploration a  licence is  required
which grants exclusive rights to explore (i.e. drill boreholes) and
then develop oil and gas onshore. The rights granted by a “land-
ward licence” do not include any rights of access, and the licensees
must also obtain any consent under current legislation, including
necessary planning permissions from appropriate local authorities.
The UK government has publically expressed support for explo-
ration, a  political rhetoric of “going all out for shale gas”, despite
significant limits to the current scale of production. The former
coalition government established the Office for Unconventional
Gas and Oil (OUGO); the body responsible for ‘encouraging and
overseeing energy development in the UK’. The 2014–2015 Infras-
tructure Bill departs from the 2008 Planning Act and the 2011
Localism Act that aims to involve local communities in decisions
which affect them by suggesting that more decision-making pow-
ers are returned to  the Secretary of State in order for large-scale
developments, particularly in the low-carbon energy sector. For
local citizens, procedural justice is  important in order to ensure
that negative social, environmental and economic impacts from
projects, which are  commonly unevenly distributed geographically
and governmentally, are not focussed upon them, and that “just
outcomes” ([50]: 39) are negotiated. Some scholars have high-
lighted a  number of unexpected outcomes that  may  result from
shale gas reserve development which occur outside the influence
of UK citizens and negatively affect them. These include property
and investment issues such as impacts on property values, and
the availability of property insurance and mortgages on proper-
ties located near to such activities [51].  As Goldthau [52] suggests,
such ‘above ground factors’ are as important in  the extractive indus-
try as what occurs below ground, and has contributed to shale gas
becoming the focus of a  growing body of social science research.
Researchers in the Netherlands have considered hydraulic frac-
turing as part of the country’s energy transition, identifying the
role of citizenship and the relational definitions of citizens to  the
state as part of this [53]. Hanschel and Centner [54] explore the
issues concerning property rights in the context of hydrocarbon
exploration utilising hydraulic fracturing in both Germany and the
US, and report contrasting regulatory conditions and approaches
which have led  to  shale gas development in each country pro-
gressing at different rates. Focussing on regulatory governance, the
author identifies policy regimes, regulatory competition, regula-
tory path dependence and regulatory agencies as playing central
roles in  advancing and furthering our understanding of the gover-
nance challenges surrounding shale gas. Goldthau [52] also identify
existing literature in this area that focusses on themes such as secu-
rity, socio-economic impact and social contestations.
In the context of the UK, underground mineral resources are
owned by the Crown Estate and the process of exploring and
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extracting these resources is governed by a  system of national
laws. Recent changes to trespass law to enable oil  and gas develop-
ers to access ground over 300 m beneath an individual’s property
have raised significant questions surrounding democracy, fairness,
and such just outcomes, as the decision followed a public con-
sultation on the matter which received an oppositional response
from over 99% of those consulted [55].  Arguments for the decision
included the mitigation of lengthy delays to exploratory activity,
and costly and time-consuming legal processes resulting from pub-
lic opposition activity. Within the DECC report on Underground
Drilling Access [55],  it is  stated that the Government proposes
to “give a statutory right of access” (p. 17) to geothermal energy
and petroleum-extracting companies (includes shale and oil), as it
does for coal operators, to  extract below a depth of 300 m.  More
recently, the Government has stated that, as set out within draft
regulations [56],  hydraulic fracturing must take place at a depth
below 1200 m below protected areas such as National Parks, Areas
of Outstanding Natural Beauty, the Broads and World Heritage sites,
and apparently qualifying this by  stating that drinking water is
not normally found at depths below 400 m [57].  In a  comparative
study, Hanschel and Centner [54] identify the contrasting statutory
and regulatory provisions in  Germany and the US. German citi-
zens expect their government to exercise great caution and control
when dealing with environmental risks from shale gas develop-
ments. The approach in the US is primarily focussed on the response
to incidents and processes of compensation in  the event of inci-
dents and problems instead of “precautionary remedies in order
to avoid potentially hazardous activities from the outset” (p. 155).
Germany employ greater periods of consideration and deliberation
of the benefits of shale gas development, whilst state legislation in
the US which is supportive of developing shale gas resources has
enabled drilling and development of the resource to proceed. At
present, the approach of the UK has demonstrated elements of both
of these approaches, with government support being explicit and
a requirement for strict regulation and environmental awareness.
As Cotton [40] observes, social opposition to  shale gas activities
in the UK is compounded by  regulatory and planning frameworks
affecting shale gas developments, frameworks which are com-
monly complex and contradictory. At present, the process for
regulation of shale gas in the UK involves operators competitively
bidding for exclusive drilling rights, followed by the acquisition of
landowner and local authority planning permission. Cotton notes
that this has been recently controversial and problematic for explo-
ration company Cuadrilla, in and around the Northwestern English
city of Preston, where in June 2015 Lancashire County Council
decided to reject several applications due to  unacceptable impacts
on ‘the rural highway network and on  existing road users’ from
increased HGV activity, ‘the visual amenity of local residents’, and
‘an adverse urbanising effect on the open and rural character of
the landscape’ and ‘industrialisation of the countryside’ [58].  In
response, Cuadrilla lodged four appeals to the Secretary of State
in September 2015 against the decisions to refuse planning per-
mission for their proposed exploration and monitoring sites, and
also lodged an appeal with the Secretary of State in  November 2015
against the Council’s decision (taken in  February 2015) to  refuse the
grant of planning permission for an existing site compound (Grange
Road, Singleton) [59]. This latter appeal submitted by Cuadrilla
Bowland Ltd was eventually allowed, and planning permission was
granted for a period of three years under the Town and Country
Planning Act 1990 [59]. According to the official inquiry website
[60], as of July 2016, the Cuadrilla Public Inquiry report has been
submitted following the closure of the Inquiry in March 2016, and
has been sent to the Secretary of State for review.
Permission laws in the UK recently underwent further amend-
ment, with changes being made to Trespass Laws under the newly
amended Infrastructure Bill; it was previously stated by  the UK
Government that these were subject to “[a] full consultation on
this policy and the legislation is entirely dependent on the out-
come of that consultation” [11]. However, proposals to  Trespass
Law changes went ahead despite the vast majority of consultees
objecting to the measures, thus creating the potential for significant
democratic deficits akin to  Swyngedouw’s concept of post-political
decision-making (see also [61,62]). Together, these facets have been
subject to growing national-level debate on the political viabil-
ity and public acceptability of shale gas risks and opportunities,
prompting an urgent need for social scientific research into uncon-
ventional fuel-based energy policy development. As  Cotton states
([40]: 1959):
“The competing rationalities and underlying environmental
discourses.  . . highlight the contested nature of the policy terrain
and the lack of consensus on key social and governance issues”
and also asserts:
“the need for government to provide broader, open dialogue on
shale gas’s place in energy policy in contrast to the current public
consultation measures that have been heavily criticised as  a means
to justify a pre-determined policy outcome without sufficient delib-
erative democratic input”.
From our review of UK/US shale gas governance in this section,
it would seem that  the opportunities for the public to be  involved
in shale gas decision-making in the US are limited; frustrated
by issues surrounding state level transparency of regulation and
access to information. In the UK, a  sluggish County level planning
system frustrates industry and communities alike. As we have men-
tioned, Lancashire County councillors rejected planning consent for
Cuadrilla’s application to drill and frack a total of eight wells at two
sites in Lancashire on the grounds that they would have an unac-
ceptable visual impact and create too much noise. However, the
company’s appeals against these rulings look to  take the decision
away from local representatives to  national government minis-
ters and the Secretary of State. Rasch and Köhne [53] observe that
negotiations about hydraulic fracturing in relation to energy tran-
sitions produce new forms of citizenship, as a result of inclusionary
or exclusionary processes. Citizenship is considered “a process of
negotiation between governments.  . .and citizens. . .about who is
included and excluded from participation in decision making pro-
cesses” (p. 107). The authors claim that new alliances form at
energy transition sites which blur traditional social categories, and
state the importance of exploring how different people experi-
ence changes related to energy policy and of how they develop
energy-related knowledge and practices. It  was observed at Noor-
doostpolder in the Netherlands that citizens who  felt excluded
from participating in decision-making processes and accessing
development-related information became politically active, partic-
ipated in  activism, demanded inclusion and coalesced with other
citizen groups to access and share knowledge. We suggest that  cau-
tion is taken in the UK case so that such exclusionary-based actions
are  mitigated and conflict be avoided.
We  review the opportunities for participation in the US and UK
in  the next section. We also propose a  system of participation based
on procedural justice in  energy decision making as an alternative
to the current system.
4.  Discussion: opportunities for public participation
The decisions made regarding the development of new energy
infrastructure such as that  required for shale gas are of  local,
national and international importance. We embrace the move
towards a participatory-based form of dialogue in decisions rather
than a  technocratic ‘top  down’, expert-led, ‘one-way’ form of  con-
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sultation. In this approach, dialogue is not  only ‘two-way’, but
multi-directional and dimensional, incorporating multiple stake-
holders [63] and stakeholder groups [18]. This shift in the nature
of the energy stakeholder-industry relationship in the UK has been
documented by  Whitton et al. [18].  Improved dialogue between
industry and stakeholders can significantly impact upon the qual-
ity of decision-making [64], demonstrating a  more democratic
decision-making process. The literature supports democracy, in
governance and society, to be a  key theme of procedural justice
in decision-making [65].
Following sustained academic critique, there has been increas-
ing  acceptance that broad public support for energy technologies
cannot be based upon the tacit assumption of public trust in  tech-
nical expertise and the assurances of developers. Planning and
decision making processes that are technocratic frequently follow
the Decide-Announce-Defend (D-A-D) strategy of expert assess-
ment, closed decision-making, and public relations mechanisms
of information provision to affected site communities, followed
by an increasingly acrimonious battle against the social move-
ments of opposition that inevitably emerge in  response. Public
engagement upstream of the decision point for siting controversial
technologies is widely discussed [66,67], whereby heterogeneous
publics are provided access and resources to engage in processes,
by which they may  form adequate personal opinions and prefer-
ences through informed deliberation and public debate on issues
that may  affect them. This is increasingly seen as something of a
gold standard for dealing with technology-generated social contro-
versy [68–70].  The concern presented by these authors, and echoed
here is that there needs to be adequate public engagement in the
processes of assessing both the social and ethical viability of shale
gas as a fuel and a  technological solution to  energy security, cli-
mate change and economic growth (a participatory technology
assessment process), and for siting new shale gas installations
downstream at  the point of siting actual fracking wells. If this is
not observed, then decision-making will solely reflect the choices
of central, institutional actors rather than those that are directly
affected [71].  By looking across at the aforementioned case stud-
ies of other energy technology siting processes, it is  clear that to
do so would likely lead to public opposition, political controversy
and eventual planning failure. The uncertainty of how local com-
munities and impacted residents will influence the policy-making
process surrounding shale gas has been identified by some to  have
produced barriers to the pro-fracking government policy in the UK
transforming into a  pro-fracking policy outcome [10].
We  have highlighted the US regulatory systems’ complexity,
heterogeneity, lack of transparency, and limited local voice for
US stakeholders. In the UK we  have discussed how the concept
of public engagement has become an institutionalised facet of
energy technology development processes. However, numerous
national case studies point to  institutional failures to site con-
troversial energy-related technologies in the absence of sufficient
community-level participation in the planning process. So, where
and how can the public engage on issues relating to shale gas devel-
opments?
4.1. Opportunities for participation in the US
Local participation and engagement is  an area of on-going con-
troversy and litigation in  the U.S. For example, Pennsylvania’s Oil
and Gas Act essentially pre-empts the ability of local communi-
ties to regulate oil and gas activity. Although some municipalities
passed ordinances limiting the location of oil  and gas activity, those
ordinances are still being adjudicated in the Pennsylvania court sys-
tem, with their legal standing very much in question. Act 13 (passed
in 2012) further limited the ability of local municipalities to  regu-
late oil and gas activity, and included a statute that would forbid
municipalities that have passed bans or  moratoria on the activity
from receiving their portion of the state’s per-well impact fee dis-
tribution. This portion of Act 13 was ruled unconstitutional by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and is  currently being reconsidered
by lower courts. Denton, Texas recently passed a series of  ordi-
nances limiting oil and gas activity which are now the subject of
pending legislation at the state level that would disallow such local
regulations.
The main formal mechanisms for engagement in the US are
public comment periods and hearings for proposed regulatory
changes, and directly contacting legislators and regulatory agen-
cies about general issues of concern. For example, the Marcellus
Shale Advisory Commission was created through executive order
of the Pennsylvania Governor in  2011. This body was charged with
developing comprehensive set of recommendations for develop-
ment of unconventional natural gas in the Commonwealth. During
their deliberations, the Commission held 21 public meetings (at
which there were opportunities for members of the public to speak)
and invited contact through letters/emails from the public. The
recommendations from this group formed the foundation for Act
13, passed in 2012, which updated the state’s Oil and Gas Act in
numerous ways. Two  important elements of Act 13  were meant
to  increase transparency: an increase in  the range of  households
(within 3000 ft. of a  well) and municipalities (host plus all adja-
cent municipalities) to be notified of permit applications, and the
requirement for companies to disclose hydraulic fracturing chemi-
cals through the FracFocus.org website (earlier legislative changes
required production reporting every 6 months, repealed the 5-year
confidentiality of production reports, and required online report-
ing).
Another avenue for public engagement is the development and
operation of task forces. At the height of development in  Pennsyl-
vania, there were approximately 12 counties that developed task
forces, with varying levels of activity and engagement with the
public. Members on these task forces were typically appointed by
local political bodies (usually county commissioners) and served
in  an advisory capacity. The main activities of these task forces
included providing educational opportunities for local residents,
agency staff, and municipal officials; development of  informa-
tion and resources to for local economic growth (e.g., assessing
availability of commercial property, industrial park development);
opportunities to discuss and address issues of local concern (e.g.,
roads, safety, environmental impacts); and enhance communica-
tion with industrial representatives working in  the area. As advisory
bodies, however, the effectiveness of the task forces varied greatly,
and has been influenced by the local cultural and political con-
text in  which they worked. Another model is  the Eagle Ford Task
Force, a  multi-county body created by the Railroad Commission of
Texas to  coordinate activities in  the 23-county play in  south Texas
[72].  The goals of the Eagle Ford Task Force were to  engage the
public and increase communication among stakeholders early in
the development, to  avoid the conflict witnessed in other regions.
The effectiveness of the Task Force, and its ability to meaningfully
engage with the public, remains to  be evaluated.
Outside of these formal, institutional means for the public to par-
ticipate in  decision-making are approaches grounded in  collective
behaviour and social movement activity. Two avenues will be high-
lighted here. The first is  the involvement of citizens, sometimes in
partnership with local government or  research institutes, to mon-
itor the impacts of development themselves. Groups of  citizens,
such as watershed organizations and other environmental groups,
have begun to collect or enhanced their efforts to collect data used
to  monitor the health of ecosystems affected by natural gas devel-
opment [47,73–75].  Several organizations in  the Marcellus region
(e.g., FracTracker, Shale Network, SkyTruth) have collated that data
and made the databases publicly accessible with the goal of  enhanc-
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ing public access to  information and monitoring the impacts of
development. For the most part, these organizations work in  part-
nership or at least in parallel to public agencies. Another avenue
has been the development of opposition groups as well as the use
of “fracking bans” or local moratoria on oil and gas activity. The legal
standing of these moratoria vary by state. The Community Environ-
mental Legal Defense Fund has effectively used a  community rights
framework to develop and pass referenda in  several jurisdictions.
A relatively new development has been the creation of third-
party certification options, which would provide citizens with
information about the practices used by  participating production
companies. This is a move to  increase transparency and account-
ability and to develop a means to effectively assess the performance
of companies across a  range of environmental, health, safety, eco-
nomic, and community outcomes. The Center for Sustainable Shale
Development has developed a set of environmental “performance
standards” to which companies must adhere to receive the certifi-
cation primarily in the Marcellus Shale region. Similarly, Equitable
Origin, a private certifying firm, has developed their EO100 stan-
dards (with draft revisions specific to shale oil  and gas) meant to
ensure performance across a  range of indicators primarily in the
Amazon basin. Both of these certification systems are  intended
as eco-labelling initiatives that provide more (and more accurate)
information to enable those who purchase energy and those who
contract with energy producers to make more informed decisions
about the origins and implications of their products.
4.2. Opportunities for  participation in the UK
Historically, a  period of public consultation is  considered by
the United Kingdom (UK) Government to  be the correct process
in which to involve the public in the development of new policy
and legislation [76]. The feedback received from the consulta-
tion informs the Government’s decision making process, resulting
perhaps in policy or  legislative changes. When new plans are
large-scale and considered controversial, a  planning inquiry (with
independent adjudication) is often the route  taken to derive an
outcome.
In the UK, the Government’s Spending Round 2013 saw signifi-
cant incentives being generated for shale gas exploration, including
the announcement of industry tax breaks, a  new regulatory frame-
work, business rate cuts for local councils and community benefits
packages for shale gas host communities [41] in order to cre-
ate economic incentivisation at different scales of governance (for
onshore oil and gas exploration companies, councils and affected
site communities). The result was a stimulation in the applica-
tions for Petroleum Exploration and Development Licences (PEDL)
from exploration companies with associated consultation. Some of
these exploration efforts, such as those of Cuadrilla in  the West
Sussex town of Balcombe in  Southeast England in  July 2013, and
iGas’s exploration in  Barton Moss in  Salford, Greater Manchester,
received significant opposition (i.e. public protests) and media
attention. This was largely based on a  perceived lack of oppor-
tunities for community consultation and public involvement on
development activities and decisions, in addition to  public concerns
that regulatory bodies and elected officials were not  sufficiently
acknowledging and protecting constituents’ interests in these com-
munities [77,38].  Conversely, recent rhetorical shifts in the UK
appear to demonstrate a  move towards greater inclusion and par-
ticipation of local populations. The recently published Shale Wealth
Fund (SWF) consultation document, from the UK Government,
argues that local populations should have more control in deci-
sions that affect them, asserting that “the government believes in
empowering local people, and wants to  see communities and indi-
viduals have greater control of the decisions, assets, and services
which affect them” [78]. The SWF  is  promoted as a  fund which
“could deliver up to £1 billion of funding” (p.  3) as a  result of  shale
gas production efforts in the UK, with the SWF  consultation doc-
ument proposing that  a portion of this funding could be  directed
towards local communities, thereby sharing “the benefits of  shale
developments” (p. 3). Such promotion of ‘local participation in local
decision-making’ appears prima facie to contribute towards efforts
to socially and politically legitimise UGD and enhance, using the
terminology of Paydar et al. ([79]: 1), “the social feasibility of UGD”.
Within the document, the government’s commitment to  “ensur-
ing that local communities are fully involved in planning decisions
that affect them” ([78]: 3) is clearly stated. However, this is fol-
lowed by the suggestion that necessary steps are being taken in
order, “for all those affected by new development” (p. 4), to make
the planning system “faster and fairer” (p. 4). Whilst this is  termed
in a positive tone in the document, we  question the apparent con-
tradiction of a  system which is made fairer for those involved by
providing them with less time to be involved. This is perhaps an
example of where the UK government’s turn away from the ‘delib-
erative’, noted by Whitton et al. [18]  as the ‘deliberative U-turn’,
and towards the more ‘streamlined’ or ‘fast-tracked’ approach to
planning is demonstrated and where, in justice terms, the approach
becomes increasingly problematic.
The SWF  consultation document also posits that local residents
will reap the benefits of shale gas recovery, and will also have an
influence upon the governance of economic outputs from shale
developments: “. . .the benefits of shale will go  to  local people first,
and individuals and communities who host developments will be
directly involved in  the decision making about how the tax rev-
enues from shale are  spent” ([78]: 3).
This rhetoric of ‘benefits for locals’ and ‘direct involvement’
linked to shale gas decision-making raises numerous complex
social, economic and political questions surrounding the gover-
nance of shale gas and the benefit-related outputs of production.
Indeed, as Cotton [20] notes, “when looking at the decision-making
control of local communities, we  see a complex and contradictory
politics of localism” (p.  14). We argue that one of the numer-
ous  approaches for beginning to understand this complexity in a
legitimate sense is multi-stage dialogue with community groups
to  enhance the procedural justice of community engagement and
decision-making. This assists the governance of such developments
by working from a  well-established base of understanding what
specific communities prioritise and value.
One of the few shale-related processes in the UK on which
there is published material is the decision-making process and
administration for the SWF, at the local level, explored within the
SWF  consultation document [78].  The document briefly presents
a number of decision-making-body options for consultation and
comment, which include:
1. Utilising an existing, active body in the local community, such
as a  Parish or District Council, to administer funds. Councils may
receive funds to  then spend on specific objectives or to admin-
ister grants to funded projects.
2.  Utilising an existing body already present and administering
industry community benefits schemes.
3.  Establish a  new or independent decision-making body to  admin-
ister local level funding.
It is  noted that local community representation should be
reflected by those selected as decision-makers, and that local
residents should be “as directly involved in decision-making as
possible” ([78]: 13). Whilst the level of detail in this document is
limited, the emphasis on local participation in  funding allocation
and local spending decisions is apparent and proposed, and ele-
ments of procedural justice and democratic governance such as
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participation, equity and representation are clearly suggested by
the consultation document.
4.3. Incorporating social justice into shale gas  governance: a  UK
focus
According to  Thibaut and Walker [80], it is the belief of citizens
that procedures hold importance, because “fair procedures produce
fair outcomes” ([81]: 182). When we consider major infrastructure
projects which produce multiple and often unknown outcomes
and impacts upon societies, raising concerns surrounding social
justice, notions of ‘procedural fairness’ and ‘procedural justice’
of the decision-making processes associated with these develop-
ments are important. For  project developers, meeting procedural
justice ideals with transparent decision making is  an important fac-
tor in avoiding conflict with local populations [82]. In this sense,
demonstrable justice and fairness during processes such as partic-
ipation and decision-making can aid in  increasing local support for
a project. Where acceptance is not achieved, local opposition often
exists, which is economically and socially costly to both developers
and communities as it can result in  planning delays and a loss of
trust [83], of which the latter is  notably difficult to retrieve. Rootes
[84] has also shown how the absence of procedural justice can
reveal how power relations between local actors may  be imbal-
anced, which has ethical implications for decision-making policy
making surrounding nationally significant infrastructure projects
(NSIPs). We  argue that the absence of demonstrable social justice
within shale gas projects will likely lead to  societal resistance and
opposition, political critique, and the inability to be deemed as pos-
itive or ‘good’. As Lebel et al. [85] state, the central goal of good
governance is social justice, whereas Fung [86] describes social jus-
tice as a central value of democratic governance. In short, effective
governance requires social justice at its core, and we argue that
effective governance is required to achieve any sense of energy
justice in relation to shale gas projects.
In the UK, a small number of exploration companies domi-
nate shale gas  exploration, one of which is  Cuadrilla. Cotton, Rattle
and Van Alstine [38] discuss procedural justice in the context of
Cuadrilla’s shale gas exploration activities in Lancashire, UK in
recent years, concerning community benefit practices and commu-
nity engagement with locally affected communities. Permitted site
licenses which were obtained prior to  Cuadrilla’s exploration activ-
ities did not require Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). Due
to  these activities being exploratory as opposed to commercial, and
being declared to cover an area under 1 ha [87], Cuadrilla’s prac-
tices complied with the legal regulatory framework (Town and
Country Planning Regulations 1999 in England and Wales), but
were questionable in regards to their social acceptability. Cotton,
Rattle and Van Alstine [38] observe that by avoiding the EIA, the
company’s practices avoided generating a  social licence to  oper-
ate (SLO), failing to produce any degree of “ongoing status of local
stakeholder approval” (p. 433). Howard-Grenville et al. [88] high-
light the importance of SLO due to the unintended consequences
for industry, such as conflict, opposition and project delays, that
may  arise by ignoring or acting contrary to the expectations of
local publics. There can also be regulatory consequences if regula-
tory authorities experience pressure from elected representatives
to bridge this social gap and tighten regulatory conditions [14].
As this agreement with communities is  not a  legal requirement
and is intangible, companies and industries may  question its value
or impact; however, Calvano [89] has shown that communities
surrounding these developments can become sites of social con-
flict and political contestation. Cotton, Rattle and Van Alstine [38]
note that gaining SLO requires establishing procedural fairness, by
engaging communities in decision-making over site licensing, an
observation also made by Gross [82].  However, the authors propose
that Cuadrilla’s communication with communities in  Lancashire
and Suffolk were insufficiently deliberative, and merely demon-
strated ‘deliberative speak’ [90],  communicative rhetoric which
fails to  ensure that communities are  involved in decision-making
and establish a  SLO.
Recent proposals look to provide local authorities in  the UK
with monetary incentives, such as 100% business rates for extrac-
tion activities, which carry potentially negative implications for
the impartiality of these bodies and may  damage “the  procedural
environmental justice capabilities for councils to protect vulner-
able constituents” ([38]: 434). At the present time, the recently
re-formed Conservative government launched a  consultation doc-
ument on the Shale Wealth Fund (SWF) (see [78]), which provides
details on  how additional revenue could be provided to  local
communities, to  populations affected by shale gas development
sites, beyond funding provided by the shale gas industry [91].
Funding, incentives and community benefit packages are reported
elsewhere as becoming a common characteristic of site selection
strategies for other energy industries, such as nuclear, or more
specifically nuclear waste management (see  [92]). On the subject of
revenues derived from shale gas developments, US-based research
conducted by Paydar et al. [79] explores the association between
local public support for unconventional gas development (UGD)
and UGD-related public revenues disbursed to county and munic-
ipal governments. The authors find a positive correlation between
the collection of ‘impact fee’ revenues and support for UGD projects,
and importantly, that higher rates of public support were found to
be  associated with municipal-level payments than to county-level
governments. Such findings have governance implications for the
UK, in that it may  be more socially acceptable and supported for
revenue-based support to  ‘shale gas communities’ to be managed
at more decentralised, local scale, where communities and local
institutions have greater influence on how development-related
funds are distributed and utilised in  their locality.
The SWF  consultation in the UK  aims to gather views on “how
government can ensure that the communities and regions who host
shale activity will experience significant, tangible and lasting ben-
efits” ([78]: 5).The consultation document makes clear that those
areas which produce shale gas through hydraulic fracturing should
receive the various benefits which materialise as a  result; the north
of England is  specified as the area of the UK with the greatest iden-
tified volume of shale gas, and indeed, this is  where it is proposed
the UK “are most likely to  see the shale industry develop” ([78]: 7).
The government proposes that in addition to the funding frame-
work previously proposed by UK Office for Unconventional Gas and
Oil (OUOG), the shale industry body in  the UK, local communities
should receive financial payments generated from tax revenues
from shale gas production. In a Community Engagement Charter
produced by UK Onshore Oil and Gas [91],  commitments are made
on operators providing local communities with £100,000 per well
site where hydraulic fracturing takes place (during the Exploratory
Phase), whilst if the site  progresses into commercial production
(termed the Production Phase), 1% of total revenues will be made
“available to provide benefits for the local community” ([78]: 5).
It is  proposed that  additional funding from the SWF  would arrive
at a later stage than community funding provided by the shale gas
industry, and that the profitability of each site would determine
the degree of funding available to  communities and regions ‘asso-
ciated’ with each site; the initial proposal of the UK Government
is to set a maximum funding threshold of £10m per site, the life-
times of which are estimated to be 25 years [78]. On  the theme of
conceiving the SWF  at the local level, the consultation document
also seeks views on the notion of allocating funding from the SWF
on an intracommunity basis; more specifically, by “directly allocat-
ing funding to households”, potentially being realised, depending
on the individual contextual characteristics of communities, in the
20 J.  Whitton et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 26 (2017) 11–22
form of “a relatively small per-household payment” ([78][78]: 12).
This reduces the scale of economic benefits beyond the community
scale, and envisions the governance of economic benefits on a  more
disseminated and individualistic basis.
The government makes it clear in  this document that funding
from the SWF  will be focussed unto those regions which act as
hosts to shale gas developments and operations:
“the same regions that host shale developments will be those in
which the benefits of the Shale Wealth Fund will be delivered” ([78]:
7).
Communities that are geographically distant from shale gas
sites, and therefore not deemed to be ‘associated’ or ‘local’ to
shale gas sites, but are perceived by some to be ‘impacted’ by
shale gas operations (e.g. by the transport of development-related
resources and materials by  heavy goods vehicles through or close to
these communities) may  suffer from this locally-targeted economic
governance of ‘shale gas benefits’. This has implications for the
distributive justice of benefits provision from such developments.
Whilst important, participation in  decision-making is not  enough
for ‘a just system’ to  be realised; justice requires both process and
distributive aspects to be addressed and fulfilled. In a  recent study
by Cotton [20], the author applies an ethical framework for policy
evaluation of shale gas in  the UK, based on the work of Shrader-
Frechette [93] which considers the interrelationship between the
distributive and procedural elements of environmental justice. In
applying this framework, Cotton emphasises the argument that
government and industry organisations must address both pro-
cedural and distributional justice challenges to demonstrate that
the decision-making process and outcomes respectively of such
developments are ethically legitimate. Cotton argues that fracking-
related planning policy development links to deeper problems of
participative and consent-related injustice that relate to  ongoing
processes of planning reform (the Planning Act 2008, the Localism
Act 2011 and now the Infrastructure Act 2015) that shorten deci-
sion times across multiple planning consent regimes, and remove
powers from local communities for decision-making control by
rescaling decisions from local to national scales. We  contend that
this has broader energy justice implications on the shale gas indus-
try and its activities.
How do we respond to what we have identified thus far, and
what do we propose in  address of such observations? In the context
of enhancing governance procedures, we propose that a  systemic,
participatory, community-led approach is required to achieve any
sense of how participation that is  procedurally just and fair can be
defined, in a community setting and within the context of energy
developments. Such an approach incorporates multi-directional
dialogue, where local stakeholders are  viewed as assets to utilise to
improve and legitimise decision outcomes. This in  turn contributes
towards procedural justice as experienced by affected communi-
ties as stakeholders, and more broadly towards the energy justice
exhibited by the technologically-based development. This is  also
facilitated by a move away from the technocratic D-A-D approach
(Decide Announce Defend) toward the more democratic and collab-
orative E-D-D approach (Engage Deliberate Decide) of governance
and decision-making. Whitton et al. [18] have previously proposed
this type of approach with the aim of achieving a  form of legitimacy
that allows communities to derive social priorities through ‘com-
munity visioning’. Community visioning is  a  process that  enables
different viewpoints to  be understood through dialogue. Local peo-
ple come together to  identify and debate community values, to
highlight both current issues and future opportunities, and then co-
develop plans to achieve an agreed vision [94–96].  This approach
promotes several critical elements, useful within the context of
shale gas developments. The first is democracy in  shale gas deci-
sions; the manifestation of this being public involvement in energy
decisions as part of the dialogue between government, industry and
local communities. The second is that the process itself is evidence
of a form of procedural justice in shale gas decisions that advances
a concept of fairness. In this respect the question asked should be;
“is the process perceived as fair, and is  the outcome equitable?”
This concurs with the suggested necessities of ethically legitimate
decision-making, in  both procedural and distributive contexts, as
discussed by Cotton [20].
In  terms of process, the approach is community led and asset
based (using the skills and resources based in  the community),
using deliberation to generate community priorities. We  aim to ini-
tiate a lasting change within communities through building social
capital; focusing on community assets not  deficits [97]. An example
of this approach on a national scale is  provided by Big Local Trust,
the £220m, 15 year UK National Lottery programme to  encourage
voluntary action and community development to support commu-
nities to  achieve their own goals. This decentralised governance
structure sees funds spent according to the priorities and needs
of local communities, as articulated by community members, an
approach which we argue can inform the development of a  socially
just and ethically legitimate system of governance for shale gas
developments.
The conceptual framework proposed by Whitton et al. [18] is
based on the assumption that a  diverse range of social priorities
is  held by various stakeholder and social groups and that this is
representative of the wider community. We  assert that consider-
ing  ‘the  public’ as a  single, uniform entity is unhelpful in regards to
effective engagement and instead recommend the involvement of
social groups that already exist within communities and reflect its
complexity and heterogeneity. By engaging with social groups, we
identify and understand local priorities through dialogue. We  high-
light these priorities to those actors and decision makers involved in
governance activities. As Pidgeon [98] states in relation to ‘nuclear
communities’, there exists a  wide range of views in these locales
that represent a “diverse set of publics” (p. 2). We propose that
a similar case is found in rural ‘shale communities’, encompass-
ing  a similarly mixed ‘public’ and range of viewpoints. We respond
to  research calls made by scholars such as Cairney et al. [10] who
state that, as shale gas policy in the UK moves from the current ‘ten-
tative pro-fracking stage at the centre’ (i.e. government) towards
new local-scale developments, more information is required on
“beliefs, preferences, and strategies of actors in devolved and local
areas” (p. 17). We  suggest that by understanding the range of
priorities and preferences in such communities and developing
‘priority profiles’ for different social groupings, more informed,
legitimate and sustainable decisions can be made within commu-
nities. This is a product of the employment of more considered,
strategic engagement with, and involvement of, diverse publics,
thereby contributing towards more sustainable governance.
5.  Conclusions
We  have outlined the development of the shale gas industry in
the US and UK in  terms of the developed and developing regula-
tory frameworks in  each county. In addition, we have compared
the opportunities that these systems of governance present the
general public with opportunities to engage and become involved
in shale gas decisions. We  have discussed these in  the context
of social and energy justice, and have considered what both the
US and UK cases reveal about the limitations of and opportuni-
ties in  different governance approaches. Governance of shale gas
developments in  the US has been shown to facilitate and catalyse
its development whilst providing limited opportunities for local
residents to  formally influence decisions and developments, with
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hearings being the common forum of public participation, rais-
ing questions around how ‘socially just’ such an industry can be
deemed. In the UK, the exploratory stage of activities means that
a similar examination of opportunities to participate is not  possi-
ble. However, the rhetoric of the SWF  consultation document and
recent court rulings in the north of England highlight the tone of
the UK approach and government position in regards to participa-
tion, and what opportunities are ‘fair’ and ‘right’ for communities
associated with shale gas sites to  expect in regards to  funding and
participation in  decision-making.
In both countries it is clear that despite engagement rhetoric
and associated processes, the publics’ influence on shale gas deci-
sions is perceived to be minimal or not at all. In response to  this we
have proposed a  conceptualised framework that aims to provide an
approach to public engagement, based on a  range of local priorities.
The framework highlights notions of transparency, accountability
and social and procedural justice as key components, to contribute
to  a methodology of effective and legitimate governance.
How these local priorities are incorporated into national shale
gas decision-making is  an area we  need to develop further. In the
US, opportunities exist via models such as the Eagle Ford Task Force
who engage local stakeholders early in the development process to
avoid conflict witnessed in other regions. It has been discussed by
the  authors elsewhere, regarding other energy scenarios [45],  how
the  incorporation of local stakeholder views into, and the trans-
parency of, decision-making process in the UK continues to  be an
area of tension and limited progress. The recent publication of the
Shale Wealth Fund consultation document has articulated the posi-
tion and ‘commitment’ of the UK Government on the participation
of local communities in  ‘planning decisions that affect them’, and
for these communities to receive a share of the revenues generated
by associated shale gas sites. This demonstrates, in  part, that socio-
economic justice is permeating the social discourse surrounding
potential shale gas sites. The community visioning approach sug-
gested by the authors has the potential to highlight the views and
concerns of communities that are involved in  these developments
and should be of interest to citizens and policy makers alike. Our
approach promotes engaging with different community groups,
enabling the different experiences, attitudes and priorities of these
groups to emerge and thereby reflect the social complexity and het-
erogeneity of communities. Cotton [40] echoes such sentiments,
noting that the “social and environmental impacts of shale gas
exploration are experienced differently by different social groups”
(p. 1945).
We question whether social justice, and indeed energy jus-
tice, can be realised within the context of shale gas production if
the institutional and rather inaccessible governance experience in
countries such as the US is  replicated in the UK. We  also argue
that without learning from such experiences, and ensuring gen-
uine opportunities for participation and influence as part of a
socially-informed approach to governance, facilitating articulation
by stakeholders of what is  prioritised and valued in their own
communities, decision-making will not reflect local contexts and
address the needs of impacted communities. This, according to
recently published consultation literature, appears to be a  sen-
timent which the current UK government understands, and one
which we urge them to retain at the centre of their approach to
shale gas governance.
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